

14 May 1953

Approved For Release 2003/03/07 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300340003-0

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DULLES

The following papers are attached:

Item 1: Food for the Satellites

- 1.1: Staff Comment
1.2: Tracy Barnes' Comment
1.3: Memorandum by Acting Director
1.4: Summary of Reasons for State Department Rejection of
PSB Proposal for Distributing Surplus Food, May 7, 1953
1.5: Evaluation of Food Shortage in Hungary
1.51 Report, prepared by OCI, 30 April 1953
1.52 CIA/RR [] Report, prepared by ORR, 10 April 1953
1.6: State Department Cable Budapest 951 of May 4, suggesting
timing of food offer.

Item 2: Jackson Committee Recommendations and Hickenlooper Sub-
Committee Recommendations

- 2.1: Tracy Barnes' Comment
2.2: Press report on Hickenlooper Recommendation

Item 3: Responsibility for "Gray" Programs

- 3.1: Tracy Barnes' Comment

Item 4: Other Business

- 4.1: Memo from Tracy Barnes re possibility that C. D. Jackson
may raise the matter of a plan to investigate BW charges,
7 May 1953
4.2: Briefing suggested by Dr. Chadwell

SECRET

13 May 1953

1.1

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. [] Assistant to the Director

SUBJECT : Items for Discussion at PSB Informal Meeting, 14 May 1953

1. Attached is the agenda for the meeting (Tab A). Staff comments on the several items are as follows:

25X1 a. Food for the Satellites. Attached is a ~~draft of a~~ memorandum (Tab 1.3) for the Board (Tab B) which, I understand, will be presented by [] for consideration. The paper lists the lessons of the recent discussions concerning a possible gift of food to Hungary and recommends that the paper be adopted as guidance to the member agencies in the event that at any time in the future the Board should determine that a food gift offer should be made to the people of one or more of the satellite countries. During the past week at least one meeting was held at the State Department on the subject of the food gift, and I understand the PSB proposal was rejected on 7 May 1953 by the Department of State for several reasons, which are summarized in the attached Tab 1.4.

25X1 The majority of the CIA area divisions and PP staff elements hold views which are generally in consonance with the State Department view. It is recommended, therefore, that DCI accept the PSB staff paper for the purposes given therein.

25X1 recommendation

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14 May 1953

1.2

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Items for Discussion at PSB Informal Meeting
14 May 1953

1. Following are some ideas which I would like to add to those contained in the attached memorandum to you from Mike Ford:


25X1 (Tab. 1.3)

a. You will note that paragraph C 9 (page 3) of [REDACTED] attached memorandum dated 13 May provides for the preparation of both an overt and covert program to exploit either acceptance or rejection of the food offer. In suggesting that DCI adopt [REDACTED] recommendation set forth in paragraph D of this same memo, we have interpreted the program preparation to be a requirement which will only become active when, as and if an offer of food is to be made. As of the time of that decision, there will still be ample opportunity to prepare a plan since a number of details must be covered before any offer can actually be made.

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14 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Items for Discussion at PSB Informal Meeting
14 May 1953

1. Following are some ideas which I would like to add to those contained in the attached memorandum to you from Mike Ford:

a. You will note that paragraph C 9 (page 3) of [REDACTED] attached memorandum dated 13 May provides for the preparation of both an overt and covert program to exploit either acceptance or rejection of the food offer. In suggesting that DCI adopt [REDACTED] recommendation set forth in paragraph D of this same memo, we have interpreted the program preparation to be a requirement which will only become active when, as and if an offer of food is to be made. As of the time of that decision, there will still be ample opportunity to prepare a plan since a number of details must be covered before any offer can actually be made.



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OSB is to eliminate it but transfer some of its functions to an Operations Coordinating Board which is recommended as a new sub-committee of the NSC. The recommended OCB membership is the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Director for Mutual Security (Mr. Stassen to serve until he designates his General Deputy to serve in his place), the Director of CIA and the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War.

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (General Cutler), should sit with the Board. The head of the Foreign Information Program, wherever it be located, should be invited to attend those meetings of the Board in which the subjects under discussion relate directly to his function.

The Chairman, who will also control the Board's staff, is a decision left to the President. Two alternatives however are proposed:

(1) If the President selects a chairman who will give the major portion of his time to the Board (presumably C. D. Jackson) such individual should determine the agenda, preside over the Board and supervise the staff.

(2) If the President selects as chairman an official who is already burdened with heavy responsibilities (presumably General Smith) then it is recommended that the staff should be headed by a man of competence and experience appointed by the President. The chairman in this case would become merely a presiding officer. (The fine hand of Mr. Gordon Gray can be seen in these two alternatives).

The principal task of the OCB is stated to be "coordination with respect to departmental execution of NSC policies." Presumably it will operate as follows:

The NSC having approved a particular policy will refer it to the OCB for implementation. OCB will then determine the most appropriate and effective method of implementation which might consist in some cases in assigning the entire task to a single department. Where however there are a number of departmental interests OCB will assign planning responsibilities to the appropriate departments and agencies and then coordinate and follow up the execution of these planning assignments. A staff member of OCB will also keep

himself informed

himself informed as to the developments under each NSC policy with a view to reporting successes or failures to the OCB for further report to the NSC. We feel that the proposal as it stands is acceptable provided that the following two recommendations clearly appear (and these conditions cannot be too strongly emphasized since if they are omitted we should take every possible step to have them included):

(1) The OCB should be given no ^{specific} responsibilities for review or approval of covert projects and programs. The 10/2 mechanism is sufficient for this purpose and therefore nothing additional is needed. OCB will have an adequate connection with covert activities through its normal operations and through the DCI membership on the Board.

(2) The report should specifically recommend the rescission of NSC 10/5.


(N.B. Language setting forth the above two conditions has been given to the Jackson Committee Staff and it is believed that it will be acceptable. Frank Lindsay however is following the matter closely and if there is any danger that it isn't accepted, we will immediately be notified. In view of this I would suggest that Mr. Dulles not mention these conditions unless some contrary thought is stated at the meeting).

d. The Hickenlooper Sub-Committee recommendations have not been seen by anyone in PP but it is believed that Mr. Dulles has some familiarity with them. At any rate we have nothing to contribute on this point.

e. The item three on the agenda regarding responsibility for "gray" programs is of course a tremendous subject with which Mr. Dulles has considerable familiarity. I believe that he knows but it is perhaps worthwhile repeating that the PP Staff are willing to follow the lines of the old State-CIA, NSA-CIA agreement. Moreover we feel very strongly as Mr. Dulles knows that gray programs now being carried on by State, NSA or any other agency should not be unloaded on us since we simply do not have the people to manage them nor do we have the inclination to accept items involving fairly substantial

The ideal solution would seem to be something like Mr. Dulles' suggestion to have much of this type of activity

undertaken by



25X1

25X1

[redacted] At the moment I suppose this concept is pretty theoretical since nobody at this stage of U. S. history is apt to give anything more to State. The concept however has I believe merit in terms of exploration for possible use in the future.

C. TRACY BARNES
Chief
Political and Psychological Warfare

Attachment

25X1

25X1

D. DISCUSSION OF ITEM 2 was suggested by [redacted] has no indication of what the content of it will be.

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C. Discussion of Item 3 was also suggested by Mr. Jackson. [redacted] reported that Mr. Jackson is concerned with what can be done to stimulate more and better programs in the gray field and stated that a solution would be to assign responsibility to one particular agency on a priority basis. We have been unable to discover, however, specifically what Mr. Jackson has in mind.



25X1

PP/PP/PL

Attachments: 3
PP/PP/PL/TMF:blr

Distribution:

Addressee
CPP
CPY
PP/PP/PL

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25X1

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25X1

[REDACTED]

C. TRACY BARNES
Chief
Political and Psychological Warfare

Attachment

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

COPY NO. 43

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

May 13, 1953

1.3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

SUBJECT: U.S. Food Gift Offers to People of Captive Europe

A. Purpose

If situations of famine or widespread hunger resulting from inadequate food stocks develop in captive Europe, important psychological advantages could be gained through offers by the United States to give food to the hungry people of captive Europe. It is most unlikely that the Soviet masters would permit such United States food offers to be accepted. But in the event of acceptance, important advantages would accrue because Americans observing the distribution of the food would gain direct contact with the captive peoples and word of the humanitarian action of the United States would spread throughout the Orbit. If the Soviet leaders forced the rejection of a U.S. food gift, the propaganda advantages to the free world would be very significant.

B. Policy Criteria

1. The offer should not be made unless severe food shortages exist of famine or near famine proportions resulting in widespread hunger.
2. Adequate food assistance to any nations in the free world affected by famine or drought and desiring aid from the U.S. must be assured before any offer is made to give away food to people behind the Iron Curtain.
3. The offer should be absolutely sincere, preceded by careful administrative arrangements to insure rapid delivery if the offer is accepted.

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- 2 -

4. The offer should be made purely on humanitarian grounds. Publicity should stress that the offer is for the benefit of the people of captive Europe.

5. To emphasize the sincerity of the offer, no political strings should be attached. If accepted, American voluntary agencies, rather than U.S. Government officials, should observe the distribution of the food.

C. Administrative Arrangements

1. The intelligence agencies of the government should be requested to watch food conditions in captive Europe very closely in order to provide sufficient advance notice of any severe hunger conditions emerging in captive Europe. It is estimated that a minimum of one month will be necessary to carry out the administrative arrangements required in advance of a food offer.

2. If intelligence indicates a serious prospective food shortage, an interagency ad hoc committee should be established to carry out the operational planning and the administrative arrangements for a food offer.

3. The ad hoc committee should meet immediately with the accredited voluntary agencies in order to obtain their cooperation. In this connection, special consideration must be given to arranging for passports, since present U.S. Government policy does not permit private American citizens to travel to certain Orbit countries.

4. Adequate stocks of food, at below market price, are currently available for purchase from the Commodity Credit Corporation. Also under Section 416 of the Agriculture Act of 1949, the Department of Agriculture has authority to give away to U.S. voluntary agencies any surplus foods in storage which may be in danger of spoilage. This means particularly dairy products, which are commodities known to be in short supply in captive Europe.

5. Legislative authority for financing an emergency food offer exists under Section 101(a)(1) (Kersten Amendment) of the Mutual

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- 3 -

Security Act, which provides permissive authority for the President to spend up to \$100 million for, among other things, projects that he certifies are in the interest of U.S. security for people residing in the countries of captive Europe.

6. The Mutual Security Act also provides legislative authority which would permit the financing of the shipping costs of emergency food relief projects, even though the destination is not a nation or nations participating in the Mutual Security Program.

7. Sufficiently in advance of the intended date for the food offer, appropriate top government officials should brief, in executive session, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in order to obtain their backing for the project.

8. The food offer could be made public in several ways, including a formal press release from the White House, a statement at the President's press conference, or the letters from the President to the Congressional committees certifying that the program is in the interest of U.S. security. Simultaneously with the public release of the offer, U.S. mission chiefs in captive Europe should formally present the offer to the governments to whose people the food is to be distributed.

Tracy Barnes
Comments on
this; TAB 1.2.



25X1

D. Recommendation

That the Board adopt this paper as a guidance to the member agencies in the event that any time in the future the Board should determine that a food gift offer should be made to the people of one or more of the countries of captive Europe.



Acting Director

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington

May 13, 1953

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3. The offer should be absolutely sincere, preceded by careful administrative arrangements to insure rapid delivery if the offer is accepted.
4. The offer should be made purely on humanitarian grounds. Publicity should stress that the offer is for the benefit of the people of captive Europe.
5. To emphasize the sincerity of the offer, no political strings should be attached. If accepted, American voluntary agencies, rather than U.S. Government officials, should observe the distribution of the food.

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- 2 -

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4. Adequate stocks of food, at below market price, are currently available for purchase from the Commodity Credit Corporation. Also under Section 416 of the Agriculture Act of 1949, the Department of Agriculture has authority to give away to U.S. voluntary agencies any surplus foods in storage which may be in danger of spoilage. This means particularly dairy products, which are commodities known to be in short supply in captive Europe.
5. Legislative authority for financing an emergency food offer exists under Section 101(a)(1) (Kersten Amendment) of the Mutual Security Act, which provides permissive authority for the President to spend up to \$100 million for, among other things, projects that he certifies are in the interest of U.S. security for people residing in the countries of captive Europe.
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SECURITY INFORMATION


- 3 -

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Acting Director

25X1

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Security Information

11 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, PP

FROM: Chief,

SUBJECT: Food Shortage in Hungary

REFERENCE:

1. With reference to a conference in your office on 4 May 1953, the following evaluation of the present food shortage in Hungary has been prepared. The question of Hungarian attitude toward a U.S. offer to alleviate the shortage is not discussed, nor are the concomitant procedures for procurement and distribution of relief commodities.

2. The food shortage in Hungary is serious. The harvest this year will be lost without heavy, soaking rains, of which there have been none since mid-February. Spring vegetables in the markets have afforded temporary relief, and bread grains are believed sufficient for minimum needs of the population. But, reserves are almost exhausted and, therefore, the outlook for fall and winter, lacking rainfall, is acute.

3. The government has used ruthless measures in collecting crops in order to build up State reserves, and is attempting to control consumption by rigid price manipulation. Eggs and milk are in special demand, and incentives have been offered to farmers for surrender of all forms of crops and dairy products.

4. Near famine conditions, reported January 1953, were confined mostly to the northeast sector, where deportees from cities are interned. Government distribution policy favors the urban working class at the expense of farmers; and favors collectivized farmers at the expense of independent peasants, who still farm at least 60% of the country's arable land.

5. The shortage of meat is less pronounced than that of other commodities, although there is the possibility of export or stockpile, regardless of domestic need. Though export trade has been injured by the food shortage, there are reports of offers of wheat to Austria and Indonesia, as well as shipments, including dairy products, to the Soviet Union.

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6. Attached as Appendix A is an analysis of "Hungary's Serious Food Situation," prepared in OCI, at the special request of Mr. [REDACTED], PSB. Attached also, as Appendix B, is an evaluation of "Extent and Effects of 1952 Crop Failures in Eastern Europe," prepared by ORR. A detailed study by ORR of conditions in each satellite country is in process, with estimated date of completion July 1953.

2 Enclosures

"Hungary's Serious Food
Situation" - OCI

"Extent and Effects of 1952
Crop Failures in Eastern
Europe" - ORR

The present Jackson Committee recommendation regarding PSB is to eliminate it but transfer some of its functions to an Operations Coordinating Board which is recommended as a new sub-committee of the NSC. The recommended OCB membership is the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Director for Mutual Security (Mr. Stassen to serve until he designates his General Deputy to serve in his place), the Director of CIA and the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War.

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(1) The OCB should be given no ^{specific} responsibilities for review or approval of covert projects and programs, ^{over and above its general responsibilities in the field.} The 10/2 mechanism is sufficient for this purpose and therefore nothing additional is needed. OCB will have an adequate connection with covert activities through its normal operations and through the DCI membership on the Board.

(2) The report should specifically recommend the rescission of NSC 10/5.

(N.B. Language setting forth the above two conditions has been given to the Jackson Committee Staff and it is believed that it will be acceptable. [redacted] however is following the matter closely and if there is any danger that it isn't accepted, we will immediately be notified. In view of this I would suggest that Mr. Dulles not mention these conditions unless some contrary thought is stated at the meeting).

d. The Hickenlooper Sub-Committee recommendations have not been seen by anyone in PP but it is believed that Mr. Dulles has some familiarity with them. At any rate we have nothing to contribute on this point.

e. The item three on the agenda regarding responsibility for "gray" programs is of course a tremendous subject with which Mr. Dulles has considerable familiarity. I believe that he knows but it is perhaps worthwhile repeating that the PP Staff are willing to follow the lines of the old State-CIA/MSA-CIA agreement. Moreover we feel very strongly as Mr. Dulles knows that gray programs now being carried on by State, MSA or any other agency should not be unloaded on us since we simply do not have the people to manage them nor do we have the inclination to accept items involving fairly substantial

[redacted]
The ideal solution would seem to be something like Mr. Dulles' suggestion to have much of this type of activity

undertaken by

NEW YORK TIMES' Report on Hickenlooper recommendation

SENATORS CHART PLAN FOR INFORMATION UNIT

WASHINGTON, May 9 (AP)—A Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee recommended today another year's trial for State Department Operation of the Overseas Information Program, including the Voice of America.

The subcommittee, headed by Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Republican of Iowa, told President Eisenhower that even if he decided to separate overseas information functions from the State Department it should retain control of educational exchange programs.

Dr. Robert L. Johnson, head of the information agency, told the committee last month the entire program should be taken out of the State Department. He said Secretary John Foster Dulles agreed. It is reported that a similar recommendation was made to the White House by a three-man special advisory group headed by Nelson Rockefeller.

In a letter to the President Senator Hickenlooper said if the programs remained linked the committee believed they should operate "within the framework of the Department of State for at least one year in order that the new management may have an opportunity for more study before making final determinations of the disposition of these programs."

Meantime, the letter added, the program's director should "be given greater authority and responsibility in administering the policies and personnel."

2.2

Legislative Counsel has been unable to obtain a copy of Senator Hickenlooper's letter to the President.

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Staff Comment:

25X1 Discussion of Item 3 was also suggested by Mr. Jackson. [] reported that Mr. Jackson is concerned with what can be done to stimulate more and better programs in the gray field and stated that a solution would be to assign responsibility to one particular agency on a priority basis. We have been unable to discover, however, specifically what Mr. Jackson has in mind.

Tracy Barnes' Comment:

25X1 The item three on the agenda regarding responsibility for "gray" programs is of course a tremendous subject with which Mr. Dulles has considerable familiarity. I believe that he knows but it is perhaps worthwhile repeating that the PP Staff are willing to follow the lines of the old State-CIA, MSA-CIA agreement.* Moreover we feel very strongly as Mr. Dulles knows that gray programs now being carried on by State, MSA or any other agency should not be unloaded on us since we simply do not have the people to manage them nor do we have the inclination to accept items involving fairly substantial []

25X1 The ideal solution would seem to be something like Mr. Dulles' suggestion to have much of this type of activity undertaken by a combination of private foundations on a private (or more accurately substantially private) basis.

25X1 [] At the moment I suppose this concept is pretty theoretical since nobody at this stage of U.S. history is apt to give anything more to State. The concept however has I believe merit in terms of exploration for possible use in the future.

* Gen. Smith will probably also take the position that existing understandings among State-MSA-CIA are perfectly satisfactory.

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
MAY 7 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : PSB Luncheon 7 May 1953

1. I was advised over the telephone by Dr. Craig of the PSB Staff that C. D. Jackson may bring up for discussion at the PSB luncheon May 7 the plan to investigate BW charges arising out of the U.N. resolution. As I understand it, the U.N. proposal may be carried out even though it is recognized that such an investigation would necessarily be unable to enter any Soviet bloc area. In connection with the investigation, however, there may be some consideration given to approaching individuals signing the Soviet-sponsored Scientific Commission Report and that CIA may possibly be asked to provide personnel for such an approach. The individuals signing the report were -- (the country in which each of these individuals is now residing appears immediately after his name):



2. Without more facts it is difficult to comment constructively on the above proposal. We can, of course, state that if required, we can provide personnel who can attempt a contact. Presumably the contact would not be an official governmental one but ostensibly a private one representing some newspaper, periodical, or other commercial interest. The information here set forth, however, may be of some use to Mr. Dulles as advance information.



C. TRACY BARNES
Chief

Political and Psychological Warfare

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

C/PP

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. DD/P					
2. DCI					
3.					
4.					
5.					
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15.					

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FROM:

NO.

DATE

12 May 1953

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. Chief, PP					
2. <i>PP/PP/PL</i>	<i>1301</i>				
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
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FROM:

Psychological Strategy Board (via PP/PP/PL)

NO.

Copy No.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
PP/PP/PL	1309	MAY 13 1958			25X1
for DCI					
3. ER					
4. RI					
5.					
6.					
7. PP/PP/PL	1309				
8.	15				
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/03/07 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300340003-0

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

C P P

NO.

DATE

14 May '53

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

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25X1